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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EDNA L. KOPP,

Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
12999

SALT LAKE CI1Y, a Municipal
corporation of the State of Utah,

Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal from an Order of the Industrial Commission and
The District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Stewart M. Hanson, Judge
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EDNA L. KOPP,
vs.

Respondent,

SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal
corporation of the State of Utah,
Appellant.

Case No.
12999

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
At the trial of this case, before the Honorable Stewart
M. Hanson, it was agreed and stipulated that the Court could
consider the evidence given at the Industrial Commission at
the trial de novo ( R. 64) . The testimony tendered at the trial
was for the purpose of supplementing the transcripts of the
record of the Industrial hearing. Therefore, in citing the record,
the Respondent will designate the Industrial Record as (I.R.1)
and will designate the Record at the trial as ( R.I.).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

INTRODUCTION

This matter was originally initiated on November 20,
1969 by the Respondent when she filed a notarized Complaint
against the Appellant alleging a violation of the "Utah AntiDiscrimination Act'', 34-35-1 U.C.A., 1953, as amended
1

( I.R.1). Subsequent to the filing of the charge and pursuant
to the provisions of the act an investigation was made by the
Field Representative of the Industrial Commission and a preliminary finding of discrimination was made by said Representative ( I.R.5). Also, pursuant to the statute 34-3 5-7 ( 5)
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, an attempt was made to settle the
Complaint by "conference, conciliation and persuasion" with
no success. The Appellant, however, reacted to the finding
of the Complaint by penalizing the Respondent in moving her
from the Dispatch Department to a more menial task. She
was restored the status of her former job only after the Industrial Commission intervened on her behalf. ( I.R. 7 8) .
Because of the failure to settle this matter the Industrial
Commission set the matter for a formal hearing pursuant to
the provisions of the statute. A rather protracted hearing was
had on the matter and the Industrial Commission made a
finding of discrimination and issued an order ( I.R. 295-310).
The Appellant responded by filing an appeal pursuant to 3435-8 U.C.A., 1953, as amended, requesting a trial de novo.
Pursuant to said Petition a trial de novo was had and the District Court sustained the findings of the Industrial Commission
in its entirety and the Appellant then appealed to this Court.
(R.29,30).
2.

STATE OF THE RECORD

The Respondent sharply disagrees with the Appellant's
Statement of Facts. The Respondent disagrees not only to the
Statement of Facts, as delineated in Appellant's Brief, but to
the state of the record that the Appellant claims existed in
its arguments under those points alleging error in their Brief.
2

It is fundamental that when there is an appeal from an administrative ruling or an appeal from a District Court Order that
one, on appeal, cannot reargue the factual matters which were
determined at the Lower Court, when the findings are sustained by competent and credible evidence.

At the onset of the Respondent's claim the Appellant has
stubbornly urged that the Respondent was not discriminated
against because during the period in question there existed two
separate jobs in the Dispatch Department of the Salt Lake
Police Department, one being performed by male employees
and one by female employees. The Appellant, at the investigatory level, at the Industrial Commission and at the trial de
novo, argued that the Respondent was not performing the same
job as males. Not only in the Statement of Facts, but in other
parts of the Brief the Appellant blatantly states that there is
two separate jobs notwithstanding the fact that both the Industrial Commission and the Trial Court found factually against
this contention. In this connection, the Industrial Commission
stated their position in this regard, as follows:
"At the onset may we indicate we have no basic
quarrel with the point made by the defendant that
there can be two distinct jobs in the Dispatch Office,
I.E., answering phone calls by one person and then another person dispatching the information received by
radio to the applicable police division for further action.
What to do with a phone call certainly requires more
know ledge and a quick thinking reaction than merely
transmitting certain information. Regardless of the
distinct duties purportedly shown by defendant, the evidence in our opinion, does not show that a male or f emale was specifically assigned to one job to the exclusion of the other." (Emphasis added) (I.R. 298).
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The Trial Court, in his Findings of Fact, found:
". . . 3. That the plaintiff performed the same
services as male employees of Salt Lake City during
the period in question in her job as Dispatcher,
". . . 4. That the work performed by the plaintiff involved the same skill, effort and responsibility as
the male employees, . . ." . ( R. 4 7, 48).
The Appellant does not attack these findings as not being
supported by the evidence, but, rather, reargues the factual
matter and states its position that there was two distinct jobs
as an absolute fact and reasons from this false premise.
The evidence which was the basis for the foregoing findings by the Lower Court clearly shows that the Respondent was
performing identical duties as her male counterparts. Five
police officers and one female Dispatcher, along with Mrs.
Kopp, testified in regards to her position that the work done in
the Salt Lake City Dispatch Office was identical in all respects
to the work done by male employees who received a substantial amount of money beyond that received by Mrs. Kopp.
Testimony was tendered as to the type of job that Respondent
had been working during the period in question. The Dispatch
Office has the responsibility for receiving incoming calls of an
emergency basis and assigning appropriate people to handle
these situations. Basically, there were three dispatching positions in the dispatch room. These positions had a phone and
three consoles. One of the monitors monitored not only the
Police Department, but other agencies such as the Fire Department, the Sheriff's Office, the Highway Patrol and the
Airport Tower. (LR. 102). When there was a need for immediate police action, the phones would light up at all three differ-
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ent positions. As the phone rings, the person free responds
to the same, notes the need and proceeds to dispatch appropriate
personnel by the use of the console. In addition to the three
consoles mentioned above, there was a fourth phone, however,
this phone was not used very much. (LR. 105). Officer H.
Lynn Burgan (LR. 82) was called and testified that he was
a policeman for the Salt Lake City Corporation and had commenced working in the Dispatch Office in December, 1965.
(LR. 83). Officer Burgon corroborated the testimony of Respondent (LR. 84) and stated that there was no distinction between the type of duties that he performed in the
Dispatch Office and those which Mrs. Kopp performed (LR.
85) and testified further, that he was trained on the job by the
Respondent. Officer Glen Grant also testified and corroborated
the Respondent's testimony as to the duties of the dispatchers
(LR. 91). He testified (LR. 126) as follows:
"QUESTION: Now during the time that you worked
with Ms. Kopp, did you in any manner do anything
differently than what she did?
ANSWER: No. She would relieve us for lunch
break and we would relieve her for lunch break, but,
aside from that, there was no distinction as to the type
of work. We all handled exactly the same type of
work."
There seems to be no question that the police officers
that were assigned to the Dispatch Office did not act in a supervisory capacity over the other dispatchers (LR. 130, 131, 132).
Patricia Lee Smith, a woman dispatcher, also testified and
was asked whether or not there was any distinction between
the work she did and the work male police officers did and she
answered in the negative (LR. 13 3). Officer Floylynn Baker
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testified that he had been assigned to the Dispatch Office and
had been there continually since 1962. He testified as follows:
"Mr. Moore: . . . and have you worked with Mrs.
Kopp?
ANSWER:

Yes.

QUESTION: . . . and have you and she done the
same type of work?
ANSWER:

We have.

QUESTION: Do you know of any distinction between the type of work you have done as opposed to
what she had done?
ANSWER:

No." (I.R. 142).

The Appellant called four witnesses none of which really
refuted the basic fact that all personnel in the Dispatch Office
performed the identical job, but, rather, testified as to the
original plan and different classifications within the City. It
was also admitted that the Respondent received at least $200.00
a month less than her male counterparts.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT

I

THE RESPONDENT WAS EMPLOYED IN THE
SAME JOB AS HER MALE COUNTERPARTS.
The Appellant takes the position that since this is a case
of first impression, this Court can look to those cases construing the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. 206 ( d 1) to afford
some "guideline" in determining what interpretation should
be placed on the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. The Respond6

ent does not disagree that these cases may be helpful in understanding the intent and the effect in regards to anti-discrimination acts. The Respondent, in the main, has no objection
to the cases cited by the Appellant as stating the applicable
law in regards to interpretation of the Equal Pay Act. It appears to the Respondent, however, that the Appellant has
strained to make distinctions between the Equal Pay Act and the
Utah Discrimination Act. For example, the Appellant states
that the job in question must be identical in nature before a
discrimination charge will be sustained. Certainly, it would
appear that the Utah Act is as broad as the Equal Pay Act and
that the distinctions made by Appellant between "identical" and
"substantially equal" is wholly affected..; , Nevertheless, even
assuming that this was the Appellant's burden, the same was
met by her at the numerous hearings on this matter.
lviuch ado is made by the Appellant in citing Wirtz vs.
Wheaton Glass Company, 284 F. Supp. 23 ( 1968) in sustaining the Appellant's position in this matter. The issue in
that case was whether or not men and women were performing
the same task when there existed a disparity in pay. The Lower
Court made a finding that there were separate jobs and, as such,
the basis of unequal pay was justified. Appellant is at a loss to
meet the agreements set forth by the Federal District Judge in
that case since the findings made are inconsistent with the
findings made by the trier of the facts in this case. The Appellant sluffs off the fact that this case, that is so copiously quoted
in his Brief, was overruled by the Appellant Court. The Court
of Appeals decision is entitled Shultz vs. Wheaton Glass Company, 421 F.2d 259, ( 1970). In this case the Court of Appeals
found that the factual basis found by the Trial Court were
"clearly erroneous" and the Court stated:
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"We are not, however, bound by evidence which
has not reached the status of a finding of fact, nor by
conclusions which are legal inferences from facts."
The Court held that the act could nor be thwarted by
arbitrary job classifications.
"Congress never intended, however, that an artificially created job classification which did not substantially differ from the general one could provide an
escape for an employer from the operation of the Equal
Pay Act. This should be too wide a door through which
the content of the Act would disappear."
There is a plethora of cases which the Courts have decided that arbitrary distinctions are insufficient to negate the
clear intent of the Act. Some of these cases are Shultz vs.
Victoria National Bank. 420 F.2d 648, and Shultz vs. Wheaton
Glass Company, 421 F2d 459.
As has been stated earlier, Appellant bottoms his enme
discussion of the applicable law on the assumption that there
was two distinct jobs in the Dispatch Office in Salt Lake City.
This factual matter has been determined against the Appellant
and the trier of facts made this finding based upon substantial, credible evidence. That is to say, the Respondent
agrees that the cases under the Equal Pay Act could negate the
Appellant's claim if, in fact, two distinct jobs were being performed during the period in question. This, however, was not
the fact found at the Lower Court.
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POINT

II

THE RESPONDENT WAS QUALIFIED TO BE A
DISPATCHER.
The Appellant argues that the Respondent's claim for discrimination must be denied because she does not have the
qualifications of a police officer assigned in the field. The
gravamen of the Respondent's case is simply the fact that
she was discriminated in her position as a dispatcher because
she received a substantial lower amount of pay than male employees. The male employees were not limited only to police
officers. Findings were made that the Respondent was well
qualified as a dispatcher. It seems ironic that the Appellant
would argue differently when the evidence shows that she
trained policemen for their jobs as dispatchers and had the
most intense and difficult job in the dispatch office when she
was working with her male co-workers. The cases cited by
the Appellant involved Civil Service situations and are not in
po mt.
POINT

III

THE UTAH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT IS
APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
At the Industrial Commission and again at the District
Court level memorandum was submitted and at no time was it
ever suggested by the Appellant that the Anti-Discrimination
Act was just applicable to prospective jobs. Again, it is fundamental that a party cannot urge, for the first time on appeal,
error on a point not raised at the Lower Court. See Huber vs.
Deep Creek Irrigation Company, 6 Utah 2d 15, 305 P.2d 478;
/l,fortenson vs. Financial Growth, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 54, 456 P.2d
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181. However, it would appear that the Appellant's position,
even at this late date, is without merit for the statute in question
must be read in its total context. The statute provides as follows: Section 34-35-6 ( 1) Provides:
"It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment
practice: (a) For an employer to refuse to hire, to
discharge, to promote or demote, or to discriminate
in matters of compensation against any person otherwise qualified, because of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry or national origin, [sic} (Emphasis added).
The foregoing language is set in the present tense and
would apply to any job presently held. The statute, however,
goes on to state the situation which is applicable when one is
applying for a job or position:
"No applicant nor candidate for any job or posmon
shall be deemed otherwise qualified" unless he or she
possesses the education, training, ability, moral character, integrity, disposition to work, adherence to reasonable rules and regulations, and other qualifications
required by an employer for any particular job, job
classification or position to be filled or created." (Emphasis added)
In the actual context of the statute, therefore, the reason
behind the future tense usage, "to be filled or created" becomes
clear. If there is an applicant or candidate for a particular job,
it must be one which is to be "filled or created".
The Court found that the Applicant discriminated against
the Respondent in matters of compensation, although she was
otherwise qualified for the higher compensation because of her
sex.
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The Court further found that she was "otherwise qualified" for the higher compensation since she was actually performing the same work and had the same duties as male employees who received higher compensation.
POINT

IV

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND THE
TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY EFFECTUATED A
REMEDY IN THIS CASE.
As stated earlier, it is clear that one cannot raise, for the
first time on appeal, an area not considered by the Lower Court.
For the first time through the numerous protracted hearings on
this matter, it is now urged that the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Act is in violation of the Utah Constitution as an unlawful delegation of a municipal function by the legislature. The Appellant now urges that that part of 34-35-7 ( 12) UC.A., 1953,
as amended, in regards to the affirmative action of allowing
back pay is unconstitutional. (This argument is now made notwithstanding the fact that the memorandums on this matter
and the arguments seem to indicate that the main issue was that
of equal pay). (LR. 297). This Court has held on numerous
occasions that the issue of the constitutionality cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. See Chumney vs. Stott, 14 Utah
2d 204, 381 P.2d 84 and In Re Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336,
384 P.2d 110.
We have, already, eluded ad nauseam to the fact that the
Appellant's discussion of the factual basis and his arguments
were negated by the trier of the facts. Nevertheless the arguments made that the disparity of wages was made because of
"overqualified police officers" is a factual matter that has been
11

determined against the Appellant. In view of the foregoing,
there is no need to argue the claims that the Industrial Commission had "Uncontrolled discretion" and, as such, the statute
in that regard is unconstitutional.

POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE COMPUTATION OF ITS AWARD.
In arriving at what the proper computation should be in

remedying the wrong of discrimination, both the Trial Court
and the Industrial Commission found it reasonable to award
back pay to the Respondent at the rate of the lowest paid man in
the Dispatch Office during the period in question. We believe
one cannot complain that an award was erroneous when it
was based on the pay of the lowest man in the Dispatch Office
at the time in question.
POINT

VI

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION SECTION ASSERTED BY THE APPELLANT IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
The Appellant in making its argument in regards to the
applicable statute of limitation assumes that Respondent's action was one for back wages and, as such, the three year period
of limitations is applicable. Mrs. Kopp's action was not for
back wages, but was, rather, one for discrimination. The purpose for the statute of limitation statutes is to prescribe the
time in which an action may be filed and is not a criteria for
the amount of damages to be awarded. At the Lower Court
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the Appellant seemed to argue that Mrs. Kopp was only entitled to three years of back pay. It is not clear now what limitations the Appellant is urging as it would appear that Mrs.
Kopp, even under the Appellant's position, would be entitled
to back pay three years prior to November 21, 1969 when she
filed the Complaint. Under the Appellant's theory they are
arguing that back pay could not be had prior to November 13,
1966. Judgment was assessed based upon discrepancy of pay
from July 1, 1965 until January 15, 1970 so, therefore, what
is in issue is whether or not the computation of back pay, from
May, 1966 until November of 1966, some seven months, was
erroneous.
The statute in this case, that is the Utah Discrimination
Act, has unique features which is not found in most common
law causes of action. The Act specifically and statutorily requires an attempt to settle the matter between the parties prior
to any formal action being commenced. The Utah Statute
34-35-7 ( 12) UC.A. 1953, as amended, sets forth the remedial provisions of the Utah Discrimination Act and states
in part as follows:
"The Commission . . . to take such affirmative
action, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement, or upgrading of employees, with or without back
pay, . . . "
Both the Trial Court and the Industrial Commission
deemed it appropriate in their orders to allow back pay to
effectuate the purposes of the Anti-Discrimination Act. It
would appear that this was an appropriate remedy in this case
and that the trier of the facts wisely exercised its discretion be-
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cause any other remedy would require a participation m the
running of the Police Department by the Industrial Commission.
It is submitted that the cause of action did not occur when
the initial act of discrimination occurred as alleged by the Appellant, but rather, vested with Mrs. Kopp when she was allowed to intervene as set forth in sub-paragraph 8 of 34-35-7
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, which provides in part as follows:

"The respondent may file a written answer to the
Complaint and appear at the hearing in person, or
otherwise, with or without counsel and submit testimony in the discretion of the hearing examiner, a complainant may be allowed to intervene and present testimony in person or by counsel."
It appears then that only after there has been a breakdown by the Industrial Commission and the alleged discriminatory employer does a cause of action vest in the Complainant. In
this case the Complaint in Intervention was filed as soon as
conciliation was unsuccessful and was, therefore, timely filed.
It appears, therefore, that one cannot allow that the Respondent failed to act timely. General authority sustains this position.
See in 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, Section 121, page 26:

"Where the statute provides, in words or in effect, a limitation on actions on a liability created by
statute, it is generally true that the cause of action does
not accrue within the statute of limitations until the
violation of the statute occurs, or plaintiff has a right
of action, and this is determined by the provisions of
of the statute creating the right and remedy; but, where
the statute provides that an action to enforce a liability
created by law must be brought within a specified
period after the discovery of the facts on which the
liability was created, limitations run from the date of
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such creation, and not from the date on which a cause
of action to enforce the liability accrued to the aggrieved party." (Emphasis added)
See also 54 C.J.S., Section 110, page 15, which states:
"Where a party's right depends on the happening
of an event in the future, the cause of action accrues,
and the statute of limitations begins to run, only at the
time when the event happens. This rule applies where
a right of action on a barred debt is revived by a new
promise which is to be fulfilled on the happening of
some contingency or the occurrence of some other future event. Where there is no present right to pursue,
a particular remedy against a party, but such right arises
only on the doing of an act by him which puts him in
default, the statute runs only from the default.
Whether the contingency affects the right or
merely the amount of recovery, the rule is the same;
if plaintiff is entitled to recover a greater or smaller
amount, dependent on a certain contingency which may
or may not happen, the statute runs against him only
after the amount to which he is entitled becomes certain.

POSSIBILITY. As long as the happening of the
contingency remains a possibility, the running of the
statttte is postponed." (Emphasis added) .
The situation here cannot be made, as the City has attempted to, analogize to an action for back wages. Rather,
this is an action based upon discrimination where the Petitioner,
the Respondent, timely filed for relief and the Commission
properly effectuated a remedy authorized by statute.
There is a plethora of cases which shows that awarding
of back pay is not designed to effectuate damages to the plaintiff, but, rather, for a vindication of policies of a particular
15

act. See NLRB vs. United Nuclear Corporation, C.A. 10, 1967,
381 F.2d 972; NLRB vs. Sunshine Mining Company, 125 F.2d
757; NLRB vs. Thompson Products, C.A. 6, 1942, 130 F.2d
363; Harkless vs. Sweeney Independent School District, 422
F.2d 319, CA. 5, 1970;]. H. Rutter-Rex Manufacturing Company vs. PLRB, C.A. 5, 1968, 399 F.2d 356.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Legislature passed a rather broad act making it
unlawful to discriminate in ones employment because of sex.
The record is clear, and the trier of the case found:
That the Respondent performed the identical job as
her male co-employees.
1.

2. That the Respondent exercised and performed the
same work as the male employees with the same skill, effort
and responsibility.
That the only distinction between the Respondent and
her male co-employees was her sex and the amount of compensation she received.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT D. MOORE
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